The Myth of the Rational ... (2007)
by Bryan Caplan
1. Simon (2000).⏎ 2. On the economics and politics of dictatorship, see Wintrobe (1998).⏎ 3. For some discussions of harmful but democratically adopted policies, see Friedman (2002), Krugman (1998), Olson (1996), and Blinder (1987). Irwin (1996) provides a comprehensive history of economists' views on protectionism.⏎ 4. Grossman and Helpman (2001, 1996, 1994), Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (1988), Becker (1983), and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) all question the ability of the majority to control its representatives. Somin (2004), Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981), and Downs (1957) explore the connection between voters' ignorance and politicians' ability to act against the public interest.⏎ 5. See especially Wittman (1995, 1989), and Stigler (1986).⏎ 6. For economists and cognitive psychologists on information processing, see Sheffrin (1996), Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), and Nisbett and Ross (1980). The main difference between the two disciplines is that cognitive psychologists are much more likely than economists to conclude that people's best information processing is not very good.⏎ 7. For interesting experimental evidence of this, see Tetlock (2003).⏎ 8. See e.g. Applebaum (2003), Courtois et al. (1999), Becker (1996), Payne (1995), Dreze and Sen (1990), and Conquest (1986).⏎ 9. For a wide-ranging survey of critiques of democracy, see Dahl (1989).⏎ 10. Eigen and Siegel (1993: 109).⏎ 11. See e.g. MacEwan (1999), Soros (1998), Kuttner (1997, 1991, 1984), and Greider (1997, 1992).⏎ 12. See e.g. Caplan (2002a), Alston, Kearl, and Vaughn (1992), Blinder (1987), and Schultze (1977).🏁
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1. Simon (2000).⏎ 2. On the economics and politics of dictatorship, see Wintrobe (1998).⏎ 3. For some discussions of harmful but democratically adopted policies, see Friedman (2002), Krugman (1998), Olson (1996), and Blinder (1987). Irwin (1996) provides a comprehensive history of economists' views on protectionism.⏎ 4. Grossman and Helpman (2001, 1996, 1994), Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (1988), Becker (1983), and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) all question the ability of the majority to control its representatives. Somin (2004), Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981), and Downs (1957) explore the connection between voters' ignorance and politicians' ability to act against the public interest.⏎ 5. See especially Wittman (1995, 1989), and Stigler (1986).⏎ 6. For economists and cognitive psychologists on information processing, see Sheffrin (1996), Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), and Nisbett and Ross (1980). The main difference between the two disciplines is that cognitive psychologists are much more likely than economists to conclude that people's best information processing is not very good.⏎ 7. For interesting experimental evidence of this, see Tetlock (2003).⏎ 8. See e.g. Applebaum (2003), Courtois et al. (1999), Becker (1996), Payne (1995), Dreze and Sen (1990), and Conquest (1986).⏎ 9. For a wide-ranging survey of critiques of democracy, see Dahl (1989).⏎ 10. Eigen and Siegel (1993: 109).⏎ 11. See e.g. MacEwan (1999), Soros (1998), Kuttner (1997, 1991, 1984), and Greider (1997, 1992).⏎ 12. See e.g. Caplan (2002a), Alston, Kearl, and Vaughn (1992), Blinder (1987), and Schultze (1977).🏁