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Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein

Philosophical Investigations (1953)

by Ludwig Wittgenstein

Submitted by @qoiauve
Book Philosophy
8.71 | Ranked
Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations
by Ludwig Wittgenstein

But can't the meaning of a word that I understand fit the sense of a sentence that I understand? Or the meaning of one word fit the meaning of another? -- Of course, if the meaning is the use we make of the word, it makes no sense to speak of such 'fitting.' But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!⏎ ⏎ [Must I know whether I understand a word? Don't I also sometimes imagine myself to understand a word (as I may imagine I understand a kind of calculation) and then realize that I did not understand it? ("I thought I knew what 'relative' and 'absolute' motion meant, but I see that I don't know.")]⏎ ⏎ I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?⏎ ⏎ Well, but on the other hand isn't the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp in a flash accord with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use?⏎ ⏎ That really comes before our mind when we understand a word? -- Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture?⏎ ⏎ Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"? -- Perhaps you say: "It's quite simple; -- if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn't fit the picture." -- But doesn't it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.⏎ ⏎ The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently.⏎ ⏎ [(a) "I believe the right word in this case is..." Doesn't this shew that the meaning of a word is a something that comes before our mind, and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here? Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? -- No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on.⏎ ⏎ 1. I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. -- How? Might it not have looked just the same if he had been sliding downhill in that position? Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so. I do not need to explain why we do not describe it so.]🏁

Submitted by @qoiauve - 08/02/2025
Book Philosophy 8.71 Ranked
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